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Abstract: This article uses the increasing visibility of Arab non-believers in the virtual public sphere
as an opportunity to re-examine the key issues and dividing lines between believers, sceptics, and
non-believers in Arab societies. It analyzes the currently four most popular Arabic-language YouTube
channels created by freethinkers, nonbelievers, and atheists and points out commonalities and
differences in style, content, and message. The article argues that the sense of a lively and growing
virtual community has raised the confidence of non-believers (lā-dı̄nı̄yūn) and atheists in the Arab
world and made them more daring in their self-portrayal and in their demands on society. As the
examples show, YouTube allows them to circumvent the hostility they face in society and in the
mainstream media and to connect with an audience that numbers in the tens of thousands of people
from all over the Arab world and the diaspora. The article argues that freethinking and non-belief
imply an attempt to re-negotiate social and religious boundaries within Arab societies and could—in
the long run—have an impact on legal and constitutional questions as well, such as family law and
the prerogatives of religious authorities.
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1. Introduction
Over the last decade, atheism and agnosticism have become more visible in the Arab
world, and a new socioreligious group of self-declared non-believers (lā-dı̄nı̄yūn) seems
to be emerging (see the introduction to this special issue and several other contributions).
While the phenomenon has been covered quite extensively in journalistic accounts, such as
Brian Whitaker’s Arabs Without God. Atheism and freedom of belief in the Middle East
(Whitaker 2017) and Khaled Diab’s Islam for the Politically Incorrect (Diab 2017), as well as
in many articles in Arab-language blogs and newspapers, important analytical questions
remain unanswered—for example, concerning the precise meaning and rhetorical function
of the neologism lā-dı̄nı̄ya and to what degree it can even be considered a clearly defined
intellectual trend.
Writing in the Oxford Handbook of Atheism (Schielke 2013), anthropologist Samuli
Schielke pointed out that “atheism”, the most common umbrella term to denote non-
believers in a Western context, might be a misnomer in the contemporary Arab world,
as the common Arabic word used in the sense of atheism, ilh. ād, does not necessarily
imply an ontological stance on the existence or non-existence of God. Neither does the
neologism lā-dı̄nı̄, which simply negates belonging to a religion (dı̄n). This could mean
that in the contemporary Arab context, “the dividing line between theism and atheism is
often less important than one’s stance towards other key issues of a religious worldview”
(Schielke 2013, p. 639). Schielke suggests that, in order to reach contextually appropriate
and precise definitions of the terms we are using, it is important to situate atheism and
other shades of non-belief “within a wider landscape of moral-spiritual critique and dissent
that is nearly as old as Islam” (Schielke 2013, p. 648).
This article uses the increasing visibility of Arab non-believers in the virtual pub-
lic sphere as an opportunity to re-examine the key issues and dividing lines between
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believers, sceptics, and non-believers. Its aim is to provide an updated mapping of the
self-positioning of Arab non-believers and their relationship with the wider field of religion
and religious critique. For this purpose, I have examined the content of four YouTube
channels propagating radical criticism of religion between 2015 and 2020, which I have
selected based on to their relative outreach and popularity at the current juncture.1 While
YouTube offers an infinite variety of content on almost any topic, the platform itself pro-
vides valuable quantitative data on the audience reaction to the published content, which
makes it possible to identify the most popular and most widely known voices. To begin
with, users can express their interest in a channel by “subscribing” to it, which means they
will be notified about newly published videos. The individual videos of each channel can
further be rated by the number of views and the number of likes and dislikes they receive.
A large number of subscribers, a consistently high number of views for different videos,
as well as high like-to-dislike ratios mean that a given YouTube creator has a dedicated
and engaged audience. The four YouTube channels portrayed in this article (see Table 1)
were among the leading Arabic-language channels according to these criteria in the past
five years and, at the time of writing, have a core audience that numbers at least in the
tens of thousands. Three of the four protagonists portrayed below are of Egyptian and
one of Syrian origin, but that does not seem to limit their audience to people from the
respective country. Additional user data, partly of a non-public nature and provided to me
by one of the creators themselves, indicate that their channels are being watched all over
the Arab world from the Maghreb to Egypt and the Arab East to the Arabian Peninsula,
especially Saudi Arabia.2 They also have a strong following in the Arab-speaking diaspora
in Europe and North America, where three of them actually live. In this sense, they really
are manifestations of a regional and global trend of Arab non-belief.
Table 1. Popular YouTube Channels by Arab non-believers and freethinkers, December 2020.
Name of Channel Hamed.TV Sherif Gaber Adam Elmasri Kosay Betar
Established in May 2015 March 2016 October 2017 February 2018
No. of subscribers 160,000 299,000 66,000 78,000
Total no. of clips 272 22 97 69
No. of clips with over
100,000 views 123 22 22 24
Most views for a single clip 641,000 2,169,000 290,000 266,000
2. Freethinking and Atheism in Arab Muslim Thought
While atheism is a relatively recent phenomenon in the Arab world, radical reli-
gious criticism is not. A common term that has been used to describe the overlapping
tendencies of unconventional religious inquiry, religious criticism, and skepticism in the
Muslim world—past and present—is the term “freethinking” (Schielke 2013; Urvoy 1996;
Coury 2018, p. 3; Stroumsa 1999). Freethinking means critical thinking about established
religious dogmas and the total or partial rejection of established religious authorities. It
does not necessarily imply either belief or non-belief in a given God or religion. Arab intel-
lectual history before the modern era includes a number of radical minds who expressed
far-ranging disapproval of all known religions of their time—Islam, Christianity, Judaism,
Zoroastrianism, and Manichaeism—and many more figures who took issue with some
religious dogmas from a rationalist or skeptical point of view (Urvoy 1996; Stroumsa 1999;
Crone 2016). Stroumsa (1999) notices the vague use of the term “freethinkers” and pro-
poses to reserve it for those who rejected all religious traditions, like Abū Bakr ar-Rāzı̄
and Ibn ar-Rāwandı̄, the two protagonists of her study “Freethinkers of Medieval Islam”
(Stroumsa 1999). While it is intriguing to know that Arab lā-dı̄nı̄s—those who apparently
1 I have excluded some popular Moroccan channels from the survey because I do not understand Moroccan Arabic.
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“are not of a religion”—existed long before the term was invented (probably around the
turn of the 21st century?), there is no benefit in defining freethinking in such a narrow way.
Hence, I shall opt for a broader concept of freethinking that encompasses both believers
and (possible) non-believers, precisely because it captures the “ambiguity and fluidity”
(Schielke 2013, p. 648) of religious criticism in the Arab world that defies the application of
narrow concepts.
Even though atheist ideas started spreading rapidly from Europe to the Middle East
in the late 19th century and some Arab non-believers have adopted the term ilh. ād in the
sense of “atheism” since the 1930s, self-declared non-belief remained a rare phenomenon
in the Arab world throughout the 20th century. Nevertheless, the modern Arab world
has a strong tradition of freethinking, which reached a first climax in the so-called “liberal
age” between the 1920s and 1950s (Hourani 1962; Coury 2018). In this period, even some
mainstream intellectuals, such as T. aha H. usayn (1889–1973) and Naǧib Mah. fūz. (1911–2006),
penned books that were considered highly impious by religious conservatives but have
continued to inspire later generations of freethinkers (Diab 2017, pp. 282–86; Ġunaym 2017).
When the intellectual climate became more restricted and more conservative with the rise of
authoritarian nation-states and, since the 1970s, of religious revivalism, many freethinkers
became more cautious about voicing their views in public. Some decided to fight back
against the rising tide of both oppositional political Islam and the Islamic-conservative
turn of the nationalist regimes by adopting a discourse of political secularism (
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(Kinitz 2018). As a religious stance, secularism is a type of freethinking because it can be
used to criticize dogmas and certain social and political effects of religion, but br ck ts
the question of belief itself. On this background, the emergence of a broader trend of
self-declared non-believers (lā-dı̄nı̄yūn) or atheists (mulh. idūn) in the 2010s represents an
important rupture from the dominant pattern of the preceding decades. However, as this
study is going to show, the emerging trends of non-belief overlap and intermingle with
previous traditions of freethinking to a considerable extent.
Hence, for the sake of analytical precision, I will continue to use the term freethinking
along with the terms non-belief and atheism. There is an overlap between freethinking
and non-belief in the area where people profess that they “have lost their faith,” “h ve
left religion x,” “do not believe that God communicated with any prophet,” but do not
explicitly declare themselves non-believers. The generic term for professed non-belief in the
contemporary Arab world seems to be lā-dı̄nı̄ya. As mentioned above, its literal meaning is
not belonging to any religion and does not imply a specific philosophical stance concerning
God. In modern-day usage, ilh. ād is a sub-category of non-belief that corresponds to what
English-language scholarship usually calls “positive atheism” (Bullivant 2013; Keysar
and Navarro-Rivera 2013).3 The new atheist writers of the English-speaking orld, s ch
as Richard Dawkins or Christopher Hitchens, are fairly well-known in the Arab world
(Jackson 2018). However, many Arab non-believers prefer other terms to describe them-
selves, such as agnostic (lā-adrı̄), indifferent (lā-ikritāt
¯
ı̄), or deist (rubūbı̄). As the following
analysis will show, these tendencies are significant in their own right.
3. Arab Non-Belief and Social Media
As Brian Whitaker, Khaled Diab, and other chroniclers of contemporary Arab non-
belief have pointed out, freethinkers and other non-conformist groups in Arab societies
were early adaptors of the internet and the social media (Whitaker 2017; Diab 2017). The
rapid spread of smartphones and the social media app Facebook in the Arab world has
enormously facilitated this development. By the late 2000s, Atheist Facebook groups
started springing up by the dozens—this is when observers first noticed that non-belief
could be a growing phenomenon in Arab societies. The transition of some activists from
the relatively closed and limited sphere of blogs and social media groups to YouTube
3 According to this definition, a positive atheist is someone who holds a specific belief that there is no God or gods, while a negative atheist is someone
who does not know or does not care whether a God exists.
Religions 2021, 12, 106 4 of 18
represents a new stage in this development and a significant shift. Going out on a limb in
this manner makes them more vulnerable but also tremendously increases their potential
visibility and outreach. This shift cannot be explained by social media dynamics alone, but
it is also embedded in wider social and political developments, especially in Egypt, where
many of the YouTube activists come from.
After the Arab uprisings in 2011, mainstream media in the Arab world experienced a
short-lived period of upheaval and experimentation (Abdullah 2014; Leihs 2015). In Egypt,
television anchors in private satellite channels started addressing socially sensitive topics
that had previously been considered out-of-bounds, including atheism.4 The young and
media-unexperienced atheists who appeared on television shows usually faced a consid-
erable degree of incomprehension and hostility in the studio. For the sake of spectacle,
producers paired them with Azhari shaykhs who would attempt to interrogate them about
their personal background and mental well-being and force them to admit intellectual
and doctrinal errors (Diab 2017, pp. 260–64). In this context, it is not surprising that some
activists, encouraged by the growing public interest in hard-hitting criticism of religion but
intimidated by the hostile reception on mainstream television, turned to alternative media
outlets. The first YouTube channel that managed to reach the production quality of regular
television was Hamed.TV (Hamed.TV n.d.), set up by German-Egyptian political scientist
Hamed Abdel-Samad (H. āmid
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Abd al-S. amad, b. 1972) in 2015, and a number of others
followed in subsequent years.
3.1. Hamed Abdel-Samad and the Freethinking Tradition
In Germany, where Abdel-Samad has been living since 1995, he is a public intellec-
tual known for his (self-)critical and often provocative engagement with Islam and his
appearance in debates about the integration of Muslim migrants. It is little known there
that he also runs one of the most successful Arabic-language YouTube channels covering
freethinking and religious criticism.5 The channel was set up in May 2015 and had 157,000
subscribers as of August 2020. On this channel, Abdel-Samad has published a series of
videos, mostly lectures by himself, entitled S. andūq al-Islām (“Box of Islam”), dozens of
which have reached over a hundred thousand views.
Abdel-Samad was born and raised in rural Lower Egypt as the son of a village imam.
After studying English and French in Cairo, he migrated to Germany, where he acquired an
M.A. degree in political science and pursued a career in academia. In 2009, he published an
autobiography entitled Mein Abschied vom Himmel (“My departure from heaven”), in which
he portrays himself as an intellectually gifted and academically successful, but e otionally
and sexually deeply troubled person. One of the main themes of the book is the desperate
struggle of the first-person narrator with religion and faith. He is unable to find peace and
fulfilment in religion but also cannot stop searching and hoping. “God is not the solution
to my loneliness. God is my loneliness”, he states enigmatically, adding that he envies
people who can just calmly state that they “don’t believe in anything” (Abdel-Samad 2010,
p. 286). In Germany, this book propelled him from a little-known academic into a public
figure. He appeared on television as a sidekick to famous journalist Henryk Broder in the
satirical documentary “Entweder Broder—Die Deutschland-Safari” (2010/2011) and was
invited to represent German Muslims in the advisory body “Deutsche Islam-Konferenz”
by the German interior ministry.
In parallel, Abdel-Samad also attempted to launch a public career in Egypt. An Arabic
version of his autobiography appeared in 2008 under the slightly modified title Wadā
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46 Ibid.  
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_hpNTYZ20ig.  
48 Ibid. 
: riwāya (“Bye-bye, heaven—a novel”). Although he was well aware that
the book was likely o cause furious reactions from religious conservatives and extremists
4 During this period, Ah. mad H. arqān (b. 1982), a former Salafist from Alexandria, became a well-known face of atheism on Egyptian television—
see for example his appearance on the show al-Bāb al-Maftūh. , hosted by Īmān Abū T. ālib on Dream TV in June 2014. Available online: https:
//www.youtube.com/watch?v=QIVHoR_1C2g (accessed 4 February 2021).
5 https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCnTJcc901wCa5vZQQot8fCw/ (accessed 13 August 2020)
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and might put his safety at risk, he opted against using a pseudonym and personally
appeared on Egyptian television to present the book (Abdel-Samad 2010, p. 296). His
unconditional will to break taboos and stir up discussions runs deeply through Abdel-
Samad’s intellectual and personal style. The documentary film Art War (2014) by Marco
Wilms shows him in 2012—at the height of Islamist influence after the 2011 revolution—
walking through the streets of Cairo. He wears a T-shirt that features an image of Satan
and the words (in English): “God is busy. How can I help you?” As one might expect, he
ends up surrounded by a crowd of agitated young men but makes a narrow escape. In the
tumultuous years of the Egyptian revolution, the courage and recklessness encapsulated in
this anecdote earned him a great deal of respect from likeminded people and consolidated
his reputation as a freethinker and fearless opponent of political Islam in Egypt.6 This
partly explains the immediate success of his YouTube channel when it was set up in 2015.
The basic idea of “Box of Islam” is simple: Most of the clips, each between 22 and
30 minutes long, are plain lectures by Abdel-Samad on a given topic within the genre of
historical criticism. Its gist is to treat sacred scriptures and sacred histories—like the Qur’an,
the life of Muhammad and the early Muslim community—as simple human phenomena
that can be analyzed with the same tools of historical investigation as any other event.
Abdel-Samad’s trademark approach is to draw on the scholarly discourses in which he is
well-versed due to his religious formation in Egypt and years in German academia. He
has a way of channeling high-brow academic debates into simple and provocative talking
points. While his views about Islam and Muslims have often been criticized as one-sided
and overly simplistic, he has always been able to justify them on the basis of commonly
recognized textual readings and historical research.7
Some of the most important views that Abdel-Samad expresses in “Box of Islam”
and in his books are the following: The Quran is not the word of God. “I do not be-
lieve that God ever talked to Muhammad or anyone else,” Abdel-Samad states bluntly
(Abdel-Samad 2015, p. 159). He argues that its content can only be salvaged from a mod-
ern scientific and ethical perspective if it is thoroughly demystified and humanized. The
Qur’an should be read as a human document that reflects the circumstances of its time
and the experiences of Muhammed and the early Muslim community (Abdel-Samad 2018,
pp. 208–30). The spiritual and ethical message of the Quran remains a valuable source of
inspiration for Muslim believers and can be appreciated by non-Muslims as well. The leg-
islative part of the Quran contains rules that constituted creative and acceptable solutions
to the practical challenges of the time but are no longer valid and certainly not applicable
to modern multi-religious and democratic societies. This includes Quranic injunctions
concerning war and peace, the treatment of non-Muslims, women, and sexuality. Quranic
passages about heaven and hell are equally problematic and only acceptable if interpreted
metaphorically in the way of the mystics.
According to Abdel-Samad, traditional and literal interpretations of the Quran lead
more or less directly to what he labels “Islamic fascism” (al-fāšı̄ya al-islāmı̄ya). By Islamic
fascism, Abdel-Samad means the political Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic
Republic of Iran, as well as the Salafi movement. The choice of the term “fascism” shows
Abdel-Samad’s style of adding rhetorical flourish and acuity to common talking points,
in this case criticism of political Islam. Rather than staying on conventional territory,
Abdel-Samad ups the ante by claiming that “fascistic ideas” are already present in early
Islam and in the Quran (Box of Islam #36–43): Islam terminated religious pluralism on
the Arab peninsula, demands absolute obedience from its followers, does not tolerate
differing views, and aspires to world supremacy. Both Islam and fascism are “political
religions” with their respective prophets, absolute truths, and propensity toward violence
6 Kacem El Ghazzali, “Kein Preis ist zu hoch für die Freiheit: Liberale Muslime kämpfen in ihren Ländern für sie, westliche Intellektuelle kapit-
ulieren vor ihr”, NZZ, 23 May 2019, https://www.nzz.ch/feuilleton/muslimische-welt-aktivisten-setzen-sich-fuer-die-freiheit-ein-ld.1483682.
(El Ghazzali 2019).
7 For an academic criticism of Abdel-Samad’s views see Mouhanad Khorchide’s replies in the jointly published book Islam der Islam noch zu retten?
(Abdel-Samad and Khorchide 2017).
Religions 2021, 12, 106 6 of 18
and martyrdom (Box of Islam #36, 7:56). From the lens of cultural psychology, Abdel-
Samad claims, it is obvious that Muslim societies share the same symptoms of collective
psychological disorder that plagued European societies in the age of fascism: narcissism,
coupled with an acute inferiority complex and paranoia (Box of Islam #36, 6:50). It is about
time that Muslim societies acknowledge these problems and deal with them in a self-critical
way.
It appears that this “psychological” approach is Abdel-Samad’s favorite and most
powerful tool of religious criticism. This becomes clear in his iconoclastic portrayal of
the Prophet Muhammad, which is the subject of the first twenty episodes of Box of Islam,
uploaded between June and October 2015. In the same year, Abdel-Samad published the
book Mohamed. Eine Abrechung (“Settling the Score with Muhammad”), which covers the
same material. In this book, Abdel-Samad initially shows an acute interest in revisionist
tendencies in Western Islamic studies, which postulate that Islamic narratives about the
Prophet and the early community cannot be corroborated scientifically and that early
Islamic history may have to be retold in a totally different way.8 However, in the end, he
opts for a radically different approach, which consists in taking the Islamic sources at face
value, but reading them against the grain. This sudden shift away from radical historical-
critical skepticism is explained by Abdel-Samad’s real aim, which is to draw a life-like
“psychological portrait” of Muhammad that reflects his deeply personal disappointment in
the Prophet.
Abdel-Samad’s portrait goes as follows: Muhammad was a deeply ambiguous person
who did a lot of good things but suffered from serious behavioral disorders and mental
problems. The roots of Muhammad’s torn personality lie in his difficult childhood. Or-
phaned at an early age and raised by strangers, he was an outsider in his own clan. Some
even suspected that he was not a legitimate child. The deprivations of his early life, which
only ended with his unconventional marriage to the wealthy widow Khadija, motivated his
lifelong “addiction to power and recognition” (Abdel-Samad 2015, p. 16). His prophetical
calling—after a relatively stable and happy period as Khadija’s husband—was probably
the result of a specific type of epilepsy. However, this was not his only illness: he was a
narcissist, a control freak and a paranoiac. He compulsively married many women in his
later life, but “he did not treat them like tyrant, but rather like a disturbed child that suffers
from a fear of abandonment” (Abdel-Samad 2015, p. 16). Once he had tasted power as head
of his community in Medina, his use of violence became unscrupulous and excessive even
considering the standards of the time, as for example when he ordered the annihilation of
a whole Jewish tribe, the Banū Qurayz. a (Abdel-Samad 2015, p. 192). Abdel-Samad further
points out that according to the Islamic sources Muhammad condoned the killing of people
who criticized him or made fun of him, for example the Jewish poet Ka
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b b. al-Ašraf.
As much as Abdel-Samad’s theses about Muhammad and the Quran and Islamic
religion in general aim at provoking and unsettling devout Muslims and forcing them to
embark on a radical re-evaluation of their beliefs, it is possible that his core audience does
not perceive him primarily as a non-believer or atheist. To start with, Abdel-Samad has
prudently never put a label on his own religious status: Is he a doubting and struggling
believer who is just “angry at God and the Prophet” but willing to reconcile? Is he a
religious searcher, a spiritual person without religion or God, like some of his German
acquaintances whom he describes favorably in his autobiography? (Abdel-Samad 2010,
pp. 17–36, 230–33) Or has he become an agnostic or an atheist? He does not say. Probably,
“freethinker” would be a fair description. This also makes sense because it is precisely the
tradition of Arab freethinking that allows him to be at the center of debates with people
from a variety of intellectual and religious trends, many of whom seem to appreciate him
as a critical interlocutor.
8 He rehearses the well-known works of Michael Cook and Patricia Crone on the subject, but seems more familiar with the writings of the “Saarbrücken
school,” a lesser-known group of German orientalists who share between them the hypothesis that the historical Muhammad probably did not
exist and that Islam originated as a Arab-Christian sect in the Levant. In spite of devoting a great deal of attention to the revisionists, he ultimately
dismisses their findings—which also have not been accepted widely in Western Islamic studies.
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d Zāyid, who appears in a series of episodes in 2019, is a university lecturer and
fellow YouTuber who runs a popular channel on the “history of ideas” and calls himself a
“humanist.” In 2017, Abdel-Samad travelled around France and Morocco to meet a number
of Maghrebian intellectuals and give them the opportunity to promote their published
works. Among the people he interviewed are Muh. ammad al-Musayyah. , a historian
and researcher in pre-Islamic and early Islamic manuscripts,; secularist philosopher and
Amazigh activist Muh. ammad
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As. ı̄d, Rašı̄d Aylāl, author of an iconoclastic book about
al-Bu
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manist (insānī) and moderate believers from any religion. The aim of my channel is to 
share my thoughts about religi , s ience and logic. It is an attempt to give the new gen-
eration a chance to see things from a different perspective, a chance that I did not have 
when I was young.”39 
Kosay started his YouTube channel in F bruary 2018 and has published videos on an 
almost weekly base through 2019 and 2020. His audience has been increasing at a remark-
able pace: Between February and August 2020, the number of subscribers to his channel 
rose from 30,000 to 60,000, and many of is recent videos have pa sed the thr shold of 
100,000 views; thousands of likes and mostly favorable comments show tha  a considera-
ble part of the audience is actively engaging with the conte .  
According to his own account, Kosay expe enced a gradual loss of faith as a young 
adolescent that was triggered less by external changes than by lingeri g questions and 
doubts.40 Journalist Khaled Diab found a similar process i  any f the non-believers he 
interviewed: “For a surprising number of atheists […] their ab don ent f faith was, 
paradoxically, actually the produ t of an attempt to deepe  it, understand religion better 
or silence the do bts pla uing their consciences.” (Diab 2017, p. 255). Kosay turned to 
reading the Quran, hoping to find answers: i n’t people always say that it was written 
in clear, easily understand ble Arabic? Instead, he stumbled on many verses hat were 
hard to understand and explain, and a great many that clashed with his ow  sens  of logic 
and morality. As he was losing his faith more and more, he experienced a phase of s ock, 
anger, and disappointment vis-à-vis hi parents and Muslim society at large: W y were 
they telling us all those illogical stories about God, Creation, an  Revelatio ?41 Why wer  
they lying to us abo t the negative sides of the Prophet and the Quran? 
As much as e stresses that h  was not rais d in n intolerant, bigote  religious at-
mosphere, Kosay expresses a strong ntellectu l disaff ction with liberal and progressive 
interpretations of Islam.42 He com res t os  who argue that t e Quran do s not promote 
violence and hatred with those who propagat  the “scientific miracles” found in the 
Quran: both approaches r ly on se ective and enti ely rbitrary interpret tion  that have 
no philological or istorical basis. When it comes to the questions f violence towards 
non-believers and the subordination of women, Kosay seems conv nc  that the cons rva-
tive and extremist shaykhs do have mu h of the tex ual evidence n their side. He fre-
quently uses “citations” in the or of sh rt video clips from television shaykhs—all the 
way from the onservative Egyptian preacher Mutawallī Ša 
ʿ 
rāwi (1911–1998) to the league of mostly Saudi-Arabian and Egyptian Salafi scholars 
who became famous through television during the 2000s. One of his favo ite references is 
Waǧdī Ġunaym (Wagdi Gho eim, b. 1951), a firebrand preacher affili ted with the Egyp-
tian Muslim Brotherhood who spoused Salafi-Jih di t views aft r the 2013 coup in Egypt. 
In the clips referenced by Kosay, he defends some of the mo  shocking pract ces re-intro-
duced by the so-called “Islamic State” on the b sis of traditional Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh), such as the enslavement of prisoners of war.43 Even though Kosay does not deny 
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 ,Why I left Islam #1—the story of creation is a failure), 16 March 2020) لماذا تركت اإلسالم - الحلقة 1 - فشل قصة الخلق 41
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fZMFZvKPjX4. 
The rea) أسباب إنتشار اإللحاد و التشكيك في المجتمع اإلسالمي - مشاكل التفسير 42 ons for the spread f atheism and doubt in Islamic society—problems 
of exegesis), 5 May 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uc9xxsT9U40. 
 ,Why I left Islam #12—suitable for all times and places), 21 August 2020) لماذا تركت اإلسالم - الحلقة 12 - صالح لكل زمان و مكان 43
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5fYrCxLumdI.  
ārı̄ and his Hadith collection9; and Sa
Religions 2021, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 13 of 20 
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t ey lying t  u  about the neg tive ides of the Prophe  and the Quran? 
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mosphere, Kosay expresses a st ong intellectu l disaffection with libe al and progressive 
interpretations of I l m.42 He compares tho e who argue that the Quran does not promote 
violence and hatred with those who propaga e the “scientif c miracles” found in the 
Qur : both approaches rely on select ve and entirely arbitrary int rpretations that have 
no phil logical or histor cal bas s. When it come to th  questions of violence towards 
non-b lievers and the subordination of women, Kosay seems convinced that the conserva-
tive nd extr mist shaykhs d  have much of he textual evidence on their side. He fre-
que tly uses “citations” in the form of s ort video clips from television shaykhs—all the 
w y from the conservative Egyptian preacher Mutawallī Ša 
ʿ 
rāwi (1911–1998) to the league of mostly Saudi-Arabian and Egyptian Salafi scholars 
who becam  famous thr ugh television duri g t e 2000s. One of is favorite references is 
Waǧdī Ġunaym (Wagdi Ghoneim, b. 1951), a firebrand preacher affiliated with the Egyp-
tian Musl m Br th rhoo  who espo sed Salafi-Jihadist views fter the 2013 coup in Egypt. 
In the c ips refer nced by Kosay, he defends s me f the most shocking pra tices re-intro-
duced by th  so-called “Islamic State” on the basis of traditional Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh), such as the slavement of prisoners of war.43 Even though Kosay does not deny 
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ı̄d Nāšı̄d, whose books promote a rationalist
style of Islamic faith.10 Finally, there is Mouhanad Khorchide, professor of Islamic theology
at the University of Münster (Germany), with whom Abdel-Samad has also held several
public debates about “whether a reform of Islam is possible” and with whom he has
published a common book on the same matter (Abdel-Samad and Khorchide 2017).
Significantly, none of these guests are professing non-believers and some, like Mouhanad
Khorchide, Ah. mad Sa’d Zāyid, and Sa
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ı̄d Nāšı̄d, are even avowed Sunni Muslim believers.
Rather than the promotion of atheism, the main aim of Abdel-Samad’s channel seems to be
the creation of a virtual “intellectual salon” for freethinkers from all over the Arab-speaking
world, including the Western diaspora. The aim that Abdel-Samad shares with his guests
and that motivates them to collaborate with him is to demolish religious dogma and replace
certainty with doubt and open inquiry—freethinking in its traditional sense. Finding an
alternative identity and philosophical answers to existential questions outside religion, on
the contrary, do not appear as a central issue. Regarding the age of Abdel-Samad and his
circle of guests—uniformly middle-aged and above, this might be a message that has a
stronger appeal among the older generations in the Arab world. However, regarding the
size of the audience, it must be considered an important current alongside the novel trends
of non-belief. It is also transformative in the sense that Abdel-Samad—if one accepts him
as a freethinker—has prob bly pushed the boundaries of Arab freethinking as far as very
few people before him.11
In one of their debates, Mouhanad Khorchide asks Abdel-Samad, somewhat exasper-
atedly, “I really wonder how you want to reform Islam if you at the same time hold that
it is not susceptible to reform. Which kind of offer are you trying to make to Muslims?
Burying the prophet and abolishing the Quran is not reform.” While Abdel-Samad ducks
the question, an increasing number of Arab activists on the internet—especially f the
younger generation—hav been offering a straightforward answer: leave Islam and become
a lā-dı̄nı̄ (non-believer).
3.2. Sherif Gaber: Atheist and Comedian
According to his YouTube figures, the most successful creator of atheist content on
the Arab internet in the late 2010s is Sherif Gaber (Šarı̄f Ǧābir), a young Egyptian in
his twenties, who has 288,000 subscribers (as of August 2020) and whose most popular
videos have reached between one and two million views. While Hamed Abdel-Samad
successfully boasts his academic credentials and erudition in the field of humanities and
social sciences, the rising star of Sherif Gaber is attributed to his ability to translate religious
criticism into the “language of the young people” or the “language of the streets.” Another
part of Gaber’s fame lies in his courage—although living in Egypt, he appears under
his real name—and his well-publicized history of persecution at the hands of religious
conservatives and the Egyptian state.12 Even though his videos are exclusively in Egyptian
Arabic, he has a circle of supporters from around the globe who provide his clips with
9 S. ah. ı̄h. al-Bu
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10 An expression borrowed from title of one of his books: Dalīl at-tadayyun al-ʿāqil (“A Guide to rational religiosity”), Cairo: Dār at-
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2018. 
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manist (insānī) and moderate believers from any religion. The aim of my channel is to 
hare my thoughts about religion, science and logic. It is an attempt to give the new gen-
eration a chance to see things from a different perspective, a chance that I did not have 
when I was young.”39 
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subtitles in various foreign languages and have pledged a total of over USD 4000 monthly
on the crowdfunding platform Patreon to support his effort.13
Remarkably, while most successful YouTubers tend to publish a new video every
one to two weeks to keep the audience hooked, Gaber has only produced 22 videos since
March 2016 (Sherif Gaber n.d.). What is it that makes him so interesting to his audience?
Gaber’s early videos follow the usual pattern of a YouTube lecture; with his informal style
of talking and the heavy use of visual aids, cuts from documentary films, and memes,
Gaber obviously appeals to a younger demographic of “digital natives” who expect a
presentation to be entertaining.
While Gaber’s talking points are similar to those of all non-believers (science, history,
ethics, and logic), he somewhat stands out with a strong commitment to atheism (ilh. ād)
with a tendency toward scientism and materialism. In one clip, for example, he tackles the
“superstition of the soul” and offers biological and chemical explanations to the phenomena
of human feelings and consciousness. In a series of videos (March–July 2016), Gaber
focuses on convincing the audience that it is not possible to reconcile a scientific world-
view with Islam. In doing this he adopts a rhetoric of “shock” and “confrontation” (uslūb
as. -s.adma), by which he juxtaposes his own rational, scientific, and humanist point of view
to the conservative Islam of the traditional religious scholars and the Salafi preachers
who populate Arab television.14 He especially attacks those who try to reconcile scientific
discoveries with a conservative or scriptural reading of the Quran under the label of the
“scientific miracle” (al-i
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ilmı̄), a widespread exegetical tendency in contemporary
Islam (Dallal 2004; Riexinger 2011; Bigliardi 2017).15 Like other non-believers on YouTube,
Gaber is confident to be able to prove that the so-called “scientific exegesis” is in fact pseudo-
scientific nonsense. A favorite topic of Gaber’s in the field of ethics is the subordination
of women and sexual self-determination; he defends gender equality and the rights of
homosexuals. He also attempts to prove that violence in the name of religion is not a
problem of marginal extremists but goes back to the core teachings of Islam and have
shaped the history of Muslim societies. The deeds of the Salafi-Jihadist extremists of the
so-called “Islamic State,” who controlled parts of Syria and Iraq between 2014 and 2017,
are according to Gaber not an aberration from but a true reflection of Islamic law.16
What is unique about Sherif Gaber is the use of comedy and satire as a means of
transporting the message of non-belief. In several short plays, Gaber stages fictitious
conversations about religion in which he impersonates all characters. One video of this
kind, “Secular or Islamic [state]?” features a bearded and turbaned Salafist, an average
uneducated lower-class Muslim, a bigoted Coptic Christian, and a sophisticated upper-
class intellectual discussing the notion of secularism.17 Another video called “A Muslim
meets God on the Day of Judgement” (Muslim yuqābil Allāh fı̄ yawm al-Qiyāma),18 is Gaber’s
most popular production so far with over two million views. Gaber impersonates an
average, decidedly dumb-witted Muslim, whose confidence is not impaired by his li ited
knowledge abo t his religion. He has just died unexpectedly and now arrives at the gates
of heaven. There he meets a bossy guardian angel and runs into trouble because the
Judgement turns out to be different than he expects. For example, the angel has apparently
13 See https://www.patreon.com/SherifGaber (accessed on 9 September 2020). Patreon is mostly used by artists and producers of creative internet
content in order to invite donations and subscriptions by their audience. Although other YouTube activists of non-religion also use Patreon, Gaber
so far seems the only one who earns a significant amount of money through it.
































































Ó(A Muslim meets God on Judgement Day) 28 January 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s1AKpD49KmQ.
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never heard about the famous Hadith that whoever says “There is no God but God” will
be allowed to enter paradise right away. Instead, he demands proof of good deeds.
A third video of the same type features two men trying to convince an atheist to join
their monotheistic religion based on worship of the God “Renos” and his friend “H. amāda”
(a common nickname for “Muh. ammad”).19 The conversation passes through the expected
points of discussion between devout Muslims and non-believers. The atheist refuses to
believe in a God whom nobody has ever seen and who cannot be described in rational terms.
He suspects that the Prophet H. amāda might have written the Book himself, considering
that nobody was there when he first received it and that parts of it read like an expression
of his whims and desires.20 The believers then contend that the Book’s beauty and wisdom
proves its authenticity and has persuaded “400 Russians and 67 North Koreans” to join the
Religion. However, the atheist remains unimpressed and points out that the Book contains
plenty of illogical and unscientific sentences. Next, the believers contend that atheism is a
materialistic worldview that does not recognize any moral rules, while the atheist retorts
that reason provides a sufficient foundation for morality. Finally, the discussion reaches the
issue of creation. The atheist contends that the existence of the world does not logically
presuppose the existence of a God who created it, even less so of a God who “loves and
hates” like human beings.
Sherif Gaber’s plays are open to interpretations on different levels. As any type of com-
edy and satire, they work with the tools of exaggeration and innuendo and play with the
repressed emotions and taboos of the audience.21 The open blasphemy involved Gaber’s
portrayal of the Judgement Day and the “Renos and H. amāda” parody is a tool of provoca-
tion that has much in common with Abdel-Samad’s irreverent portrayal of the Prophet, but
the theatrical enactment gives it an additional edge. Gaber’s believing critics—who are at
least as numerous and vocal as his supporters—correctly point out that the religious types
he impersonates and the things they say about religion are grotesque caricatures that do not
represent a deeper understanding of Islam.22 Indeed, one might question whether Gaber’s
stark juxtaposition of various figures representing his own atheistic point of view and a
parade of devout morons and bigots can deliver an intellectually compelling criticism of
Islam as such. Needless to say, the atheist always easily wins the argument.
On a different level, Gaber’s satire can also be read as a biting commentary on so-
cially existing religion, in which case it becomes hard to deny that his figures—however
exaggerated—are taken from real life in Egypt and the Arab world. People like them can
be witnessed in religious debates on television on a frequent basis, and they constitute
a constant source of anxiety for Arab non-believers who are considering to “come out”
about their non-belief.23 On this background, they can easily relate to the scenes enacted by
Gaber. For the non-believers who make up his large group of fans and admirers, Gaber’s
plays have a potential of catharsis and self-assurance: First, they allow them to have a good
laugh about social situations that are filled with awkwardness and anxiety in their own
imagination or experience. Second, they symbolically reverse the balance of power, which
is heavily tilted in favor of the religious conservatives in real life (Jackson 2018; Diab 2017,
pp. 244–93; Whitaker 2017; Schielke 2013, p. 647). In Sherif Gaber’s parallel universe, the











. (A sheykh calls an atheist to the veneration of a deity) 19 February 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mG6
4EUUxOj4.
20 A somewhat distorted allusion to the story of Zaynab bint Ǧah. š, which is frequently mentioned by Arab non-believers, cf. (Abdel-Samad 2015,
pp. 127–32). According to the Quran (Q 33:37), God personally decreed Muhammad’s marriage to Zaynab, thereby changing the rule that Muslims
could not marry the former wives of their adopted sons.
21 For a more detailed analysis of the use of humour among Arab atheists, see the contribution of Lena Richter in this special issue.













(“Know it with your intellect” (7) A sheykh calls an atheist to
the veneration of a deity). 24 March 2018 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KkIifQdSjKA.
23 According to numerous accounts collected by journalists, non-believers face hostile reactions from relatives, friends, and acquaintances on a daily
basis, and many more have probably been choosing to keep their real convictions to themselves. See (Jackson 2018; Whitaker 2017, pp. 77–98;
Diab 2017, pp. 244–93).
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intellectual and moral superiority. Even Heaven is on the side of the non-believers: In the
Judgement Day scenario, it turns out that God has just been watching a video of Carl Sagan,
an American science popularizer with avowedly naturalist and agnostic convictions—and
He enjoyed it greatly!24
3.3. Adam Elmasri: A Deist Alternative to Atheism?
While the shock-and-confrontation style of Hamed Abdel-Samad and Sherif Gaber is
probably one of the keys to their social media fame, there are other paths to success as well.
On the basis of the well-known accounts of Arab Atheism, the Egyptian Adam Elmasri (a
pseudonym), may appear as a rather untypical Arab non-believer. He was not born into
Islam, but into Coptic Christianity, and he does not declare himself an atheist (mulh. ı̄d), but
describes his own beliefs as deist (rubūbı̄). Since the start of his YouTube channel in October
2017, he has been able to gather an audience of over 60,000 subscribers, and more than a
dozen of his videos have crossed the threshold of 100,000 views. Thousands of favorable
comments and questions under his videos also reveal that his message motivates a high
degree of engagement among his audience.
From his videos, it is possible to put together a fairly detailed intellectual and religious
biography of Adam Elmasri. Doubtless, Adam’s ability to verbalize and explain the com-
plex intellectual and emotional process of becoming an unbeliever is one of the strengths
of the channel. Adam was born in the late 1970s in Cairo and grew up in Egypt as a Coptic
Orthodox Christian.25 He describes his former self as a committed believer who enjoyed
mass and spiritual retreats at monasteries (a common practice among Coptic Orthodox
believers) and lived his daily life “in the company of Jesus Christ.” As an adolescent,
he became engaged in religious dialogue and acquired a great deal of knowledge about
Islam through reading and attending discussion groups with Muslims. He graduated from
college in Egypt and worked for a while as a graphics designer. Adam’s departure from
Christianity only occurred after he migrated from Egypt to a Western country at the age of
27.26 He had already reached his thirties when, after enrolling in a humanities-based BA
program of Biblical Studies, he came to realize that “religions are just a human invention
and that there is no such thing as revelation.” Adam describes his departure from religion
as intellectually liberating—stressing the enlightening effect of philosophical reasoning
and scientific knowledge—but also as emotionally painful.
In several videos, Adam explains why rejecting religion has not turned him into an
atheist stricto sensu. He describes himself as a lā-dı̄nı̄, someone who does not follow any
religion, and a deist (rubūbı̄), a believer in some sort of “first mover” (musabbib awwal) or
creating force (quwa
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9 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Buḫārī. Nihāyat usṭūra (“Sahih al-Bukhari—the end of a legend”), Rabat: Dār al-Waṭan, 2017. 
10 An expression borrowed from title of one of his books: Dalīl at-tadayyun al-ʿāqil (“A Guide to rational religiosity”), Cairo: Dār at-
Tanwīr, 2017. 
11 For portraits of previous modern Arab freethinkers like Ameen Rihani, Ǧamīl Ṣidqī az-Zahāwi and Maʿrūf ar-Ruṣāfī see Coury 
2018. 
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Walsch, who is considered a representative of New Age or non-religious spirituality.29
Quite different in style are a number of carefully produced “short films” that highlight the
emotional, personal side of non-belief and the search for answers to existential questions.30
Considering the effort that must have gone into them, they seem to be closest to Adam’s
heart and personal aspiration. However, regarding the number of views and comments,
his audience clearly prefers Adam in his role as a hard-hitting, witty and academically
informed critic of religious dogma.
Most of his videos, as well as his most popular ones fall into this category. Their
general style is that of an educational lecture, but Adam Elmasri’s eloquent rhetorical
style and consistent use of colloquial Egyptian Arabic also inspire a degree of informality.
Adam’s videos are split between those attacking specific Christian and Islamic dogmas,
such as the resurrection of Christ or the inimitability of the Quran, and those that criticize
teachings that are in some way common to Islam and Christianity. Adam’s treatment of
Christianity is clearly focused on the Egyptian context and goes right to the core of the most
commonly held religious beliefs and practices among Coptic Orthodox Christians (Voile
2004; Heo 2018). In one of the first videos of this kind, he challenges the claim of the Coptic
Orthodox Church that it has preserved the authentic original doctrine of Christianity. He
describes the large variety of Christian teachings from the very beginning and argues that,
from a scientific point of view, there is no such thing as the original Christian doctrine.31
Even the compilation of the Gospel, he argues, was subject to a great deal of historical
accident. Subsequently, Adam Elmasri published a series of clips that challenge and debunk
“Christian miracles”: the widely celebrated Marian apparitions in Zaytūn (1968) and in
other places across Egypt; the Holy Fire miracle experienced by Orthodox Christians every
year at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem; miracles of healing attributed to the
Virgin Mary or famous Arab Christian saints.32 In addition to this, Adam’s channel also
offers a series of more scholarly lectures on the history of Christianity.
While Adam originally started out with the aim of offering a rationalist and historical-
critical commentary on Orthodox Christianity and an introduction to non-belief, he quickly
got drawn into the already raging YouTube rivalry between propagandists of Islam, mostly
of the Salafi tendency, and Arab non-believers. His commentary on Islam was triggered
by audience reactions and debates, rather than by a pre-conceived agenda.33 In his replies
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33 Adam Elmasri, video-interview with the author, 16 August 2020.
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“invite him to Islam,” Adam goes much less into the details of everyday piety and mostly
focuses on scientific mistakes and logical contradictions within the Quran.34
His favorite approach, however, consists in challenging shared dogmatic issues of the
monotheistic religions, as well as social mores that are based on conservative interpretations
of Islam and Christianity. This approach is especially significant, because it marks him
out as a principled non-believer, whose message cannot easily be misconstrued as being
just anti-Islam or anti-Christianity, a common misconception by social media users.35
Among the shared dogmatic elements in the monotheistic religions that Adam subjects to
a historical criticism are the Deluge and the figure of Satan.36 As always, the message is
they are in fact human inventions, “legends” (asāt. ı̄r) and “illusions” (awhām) that can easily
be demystified with the tools of natural science and by historical-critical inquiry into the
religious traditions themselves. In a series of videos entitled Rabbinā
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ayiz kiddah (“God
wills it”), Adam discusses religious commandments pertaining to social and personal life:
marriage and divorce, gender relations, love and sex, and homosexuality. He states, “My
problem is not with religion in itself, but with those who claim to know exactly what God
wants and want to force everyone to live accordingly.”37 Based on a general philosophical
reasoning, he calls for gender equality in marriage and divorce and the acceptance of
homosexuality as a biologically given inclination, not a choice, and argues that pre-marital
intercourse should not be considered as “adultery” (zinā). Following up on the argument
that the rules of the Sharia and Christian canon law are man-made and not sanctioned by
God, he invites his viewers to imagine a God who “does not want us” to follow these rules,
but only requires us to “live together in human kindness.”38
3.4. Kosay Betar: Agnosticism and the Question of Coexistence
A shared characteristic between Adam Elmasri (Adam Elmasri n.d.) and Kosay Betar
(Qus.ayy Bı̄t.ār) (Kosay Betar n.d.), another emerging YouTube figure of the late 2010s, is
the more nuanced approach towards belief and unbelief that does not construe them as
polar opposites. Kosay is a Syrian in his twenties who lives in a Western country. He
describes himself as a self-taught “agnostic” (lā-adrı̄) without any claim to philosophical or
academic erudition. His videos consist in entertaining lectures and fictional conversations
in colloquial Syrian Arabic. The self-descri tion of his channel—as of August 2020—reads
as follows: “Hello, I’m Qus.ay Bı̄t.ār from Damascus, Syria. [ . . . ] I love and respect all
humanist (insānı̄) and moderate believers from any religion. The aim of my channel is
to share my thoughts about religion, science and logic. It is an attempt to give the new
generation a chance to see things from a different perspective, a chance that I did not have
when I was young.”39
Kosay started his YouTube channel in February 2018 and has published videos on
an almost weekly base through 2019 and 2020. His audience has been increasing at
a remarkable pace: Between February and August 2020, the number of subscribers to
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his channel rose from 30,000 to 60,000, and many of his recent videos have passed the
threshold of 100,000 views; thousands of likes and mostly favorable comments show that a
considerable part of the audience is actively engaging with the content.
According to his own account, Kosay experienced a gradual loss of faith as a young
adolescent that was triggered less by external changes than by lingering questions and
doubts.40 Journalist Khaled Diab found a similar process in many of the non-believers he
interviewed: “For a surprising number of atheists [ . . . ] their abandonment of faith was,
paradoxically, actually the product of an attempt to deepen it, understand religion better
or silence the doubts plaguing their consciences.” (Diab 2017, p. 255). Kosay turned to
reading the Quran, hoping to find answers: didn’t people always say that it was written
in clear, easily understandable Arabic? Instead, he stumbled on many verses that were
hard to understand and explain, and a great many that clashed with his own sense of logic
and morality. As he was losing his faith more and more, he experienced a phase of shock,
anger, and disappointment vis-à-vis his parents and Muslim society at large: Why were
they telling us all those illogical stories about God, Creation, and Revelation?41 Why were
they lying to us about the negative sides of the Prophet and the Quran?
As much as he stresses that he was not raised in an intolerant, bigoted religious
atmosphere, Kosay expresses a strong intellectual disaffection with liberal and progressive
interpretations of Islam.42 He compares those who argue that the Quran does not promote
violence and hatred with those who propagate the “scientific miracles” found in the
Quran: both approaches rely on selective and entirely arbitrary interpretations that have
no philological or historical basis. When it comes to the questions of violence towards non-
believers and the subordination of women, Kosay seems convinced that the conservative
and extremist shaykhs do have much of the textual evidence on their side. He frequently
uses “citations” in the form of short video clips from television shaykhs—all the way
from the conservative Egyptian preacher Mutawallı̄ Ša
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rāwi (1911–1998) to the league of
mostly Saudi-Arabian and Egyptian Salafi scholars who became famous through television
during the 2000s. One of his favorite references is Waǧdı̄ Ġunaym (Wagdi Ghoneim, b.
1951), a firebrand preacher affiliated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood who espoused
Salafi-Jihadist views after the 2013 coup in Egypt. In the clips referenced by Kosay, he
defends some of the most shocking practices re-introduced by the so-called “Islamic State”
on the basis of traditional Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), such as the enslavement of prisoners
of war.43 Even though Kosay does not deny that different, more moderate interpretations
of Islam exist and have a broad following, he mistrusts the broad influence of the “bigoted”
(muta
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as. s. ibūn) shaykhs in Arab societies, especially over uneducated people. It’s the moral
outrage at the injustice of both the foundational religious texts—Quran and Hadith—and
the conservative scholars and preachers who uphold them to this and try to force them on
society, that fuels Kosay’s drive to dismiss the religious tradition altogether.
Kosay’s attacks on religious dogma follow his personal explorations along the main
paths of non-belief described above: textual criticism, philosophical reasoning, and his-
torical inquiry. What is unique about his channel is Kosay’s thoughtful engagement with
a question that is probably quite essential to those who have lost their faith: What now?
After deciding to leave Islam, where do I go? What does atheism even mean and what















Q¢Ë@(The deceivers #7—the path towards non-belief), 8 August 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ITOs5


























































@(The reasons for the spread of atheism and doubt in Islamic society—problems of












XAÖÏ12 - 	àA¾Ó ð 	àAÓ 	P É¾Ë lÌ'A(Why I left Islam #12—suitable for all times and places), 21 August 2020, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=5fYrCxLumdI.
Religions 2021, 12, 106 14 of 18
and prejudice? How do I sort out my relationship with believers, both intellectually and
emotionally?
In one of his earliest videos, Kosay takes to task the arrogance and excessive in-
group/out-group thinking of many non-believers, especially recent ones: “Atheism does
not make you more intelligent or more educated!”44 Some have left religion merely because
of an emotional crisis or because it is “cool.”45 Many atheists, he warns, have experienced
a sudden, superficial and ill-digested conversion, which then becomes a source of intoler-
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is not a matter of intelligence (d
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), and people with different
convictions can still respect and love each other. Still, unbelievers have something impor-
tant to give because they contribute to the sp ead of scienc and logic in societies that have
been intellectually stagnant for a l ng time.
On a related note, Kosay points out that people who have left religion are still in
search of a worldview and an ethical orientati n that they find ra ionally convincing
and emotionally appealing.46 The path to ard settling on a new c viction can be long
and arduous. For example, there is no teleological progression from religious belief to
deism, then agnosticism, and finally ositive atheism. Any of those stages is a valid
intellectual stance in itself. Kosay stresses that is it important to explain these differences to
religious believers as well, in order to counteract the problem that non-believers in Arab
societies get lumped together indiscriminately under the label of atheism (ilh. ād), which
is fraught with negative connotations.47 Kosay makes a lot of effort to confront the most
common preconceptions and accusations faced by non-believers and to suggest effective
counter-arguments.
For example, it is a common misconception (according to Kosay) that atheism and its
emphasis on science leads to a materialist belief in the non-existence of God.48 In contrast,
he proposes that non-believers simply place knowledge above belief and hence refuse to
believe in things or theories that they do not find intellectually convincing, a stance called
agnosticism (lā adrı̄ya). When Muslim believers p rtray disbelief as so ething eccentric
or implausible, it should be pointed out that disbelief is in fact quite a common thing:
Most believers only believe in one particular God and disbelieve in all the other Gods that
other humans believe in. Another common prejudice is the one that equates atheism with
(supposedly) anti-religious modern ideologies such as communism or National Socialism
and the cri es committed in their name. Kosay concedes that (unlike Hitler) Stalin and
Mao were indeed atheists. However, he argues that what united Stalin and Mao and
motivated their brutal methods was their “belief in the absolute power of the state.” Political
authoritarianism of this kind can be accompanied with a desire to abolish religion, but it can
also be combined with a drive to control religio and use it as a to l of dominance, which
according to Kosay is the case with t e regimes of the Arab world. The most important
point, however, is that different from any given religion, atheism is not a single doctrine
with a fixed set of books or references. There is no atheist Book that constitutes the basis of
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A different but equally common accusation is that atheism is only a cover-up for the
unbridled pursuit of carnal pleasure.49 According to Kosay, conservative believers like to
picture atheists as people who migrate to the West in order live a life full of parties, alcohol,
and sex. Here, he argues that they completely misconstrue a lifestyle that is in principle
open to religiously prohibited pleasures like alcohol or premarital relationships. Why do
they only focus on the sexual aspects of relationships and fail to recognize that they are
as much about love, mutual respect, and responsibility? As matter of fact, there are many
Muslims in Arab countries who pursue a hedonistic lifestyle; the pursuit of pleasure has
nothing really to do with the question of belief and unbelief. For a man whose only concern
in life is to give free rein to his sexual drive, the most appealing choice should not be any
Western state but the Islamic system propagated by Salafi Muslim and in which men will
be allowed to sleep with an almost unlimited number of wives and female slaves.
In one of his clips, Kosay states the view that, while non-believers will always be in a
zero-sum struggle with the “bigots” (muta
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aibūn)—among the learned authorities as well
as among the common people—there is a chance that they can coexist and be on friendly
terms with other Muslim believers.50 There are those educated Muslim who try to interpret
the Quran in a contemporary way, who believe in a tolerant and forgiving God, and who
want to live in peace with people from other religions. However, there are also uneducated
Muslims who live with a simple belief in a good God and a desire to lead an ethical life,
and there is no reason to be in conflict with them either.
4. Discussion
All of the freethinkers and non-believers covered in this survey are firm in their rejec-
tion of the sanctity of religious beliefs and dogmas and in their insistence that everybody
should have the right to criticize them and even make fun of them outright. In the Arab
world, where there is a long tradition of expressing doubt about religious dogma in a
nuanced, allusive or figurative way, and in small and often ‘elitist’ social circles, this is a
significant innovation. The deeper socio-economic reasons of this phenomenon remain
to be explored: migration and the globalization of education and media, individualism
and consumerism, the demographic transition and weakening of traditional family and
neighborhood structures. The fact that the phenomenon also includes members of religious
minorities seems highly significant in this context, but remains to be explored more thor-
oughly. However, there is no doubt th t the apparent spread of freethinking and non-belief
at this particular point in history has been made possible to a large extent by advances in
media technology. Only the rapid spread of social media in the Arab world and the increas-
ing availability of low-budget broadcasting technology have enabled a new generation
of Arab non-believers to move beyond the limits of book-reading intellectual circles and
beyond the hostile environment of the mainstream media and begin to address—in some
cases apparently with considerable success—a wider Arabic-speaking public.
Beyond the general agreement on unlimited free speech concerning religion, there are
important differences in style and intellectual approach. First, there is the differentiation in
the protagonists’ self-description: On the one hand, there are the non-believers who see
themselves as atheists (Sherif Gaber) or use the more generic term lā-dı̄nı̄ plus an additional
qualifier like agnostic (Kosay Betar) or theist (Adam Elmasri). On the other hand, there are
those who continue to identify with the religion they were born into or refuse to declare
their religious status and form whom I have suggested the term freethinkers. If people in
this group use self-descriptions, these do not indicate whether they are believers or not but
focus on other aspects of their intellectual stance, such as secularism (
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seems likely that freethinkers find it easier to reach a degree of public acceptance and
insert themselves into general debates, even if their criticism of religion is as radical as
that of the non-believers. However, Abdel-Samad’s apparent advantage over the other
YouTubers in this area might as well boil down to his being older or being in possession of
higher social capital as a successful academic and writer in a Western country. All things
considered, it remains an open question if radical freethinking and atheism can benefit
from their presence in the social media to become a more regular feature of public debates
in the Arab world.
When it comes to the intellectual content and the type of arguments used, the distinc-
tion between freethinkers and non-believers is of less significance. All four channels delve
into the four overlapping areas of critical thinking: natural science, textual criticism of the
Holy Books, the history of religion, and philosophy (ethics and logic). The kind of mix de-
pends mostly on the intellectual formation and preferences of the individual protagonists.
Abdel-Samad relies mostly on his sphere of academic expertise, social sciences and history,
plus textual criticism of the Quran and the Hadiths, while Sherif Gaber has the strongest
focus on natural science—as mentioned he is the one closest to a ‘materialist’ conception of
atheism. Adam Elmasri derives most of his input from historical and textual criticism, but
has a much stronger philosophical side than the other channels.
There is also evidence of what Gavin Hyman has called the “reactivity” of atheist
thought to the religious culture that it rejects (Hyman 2017, p. 29). The criticism brought
forward against Islamic theology is focused very strongly on the scriptural meaning of the
Quran and certain Hadiths and shows little interest in or in-depth knowledge of scholarly
traditions. This is quite probably a reflection of the fact that literalist and fundamentalist
interpretations have come to dominate popular knowledge of Islam in Egypt and the
Arab world in recent decades (Schielke 2015, pp. 65–82). In addition, the most active
opponents of the non-believers on YouTube are almost uniformly Salafi-styled activists
who themselves contribute to directing the debate towards the exegesis of the foundational
texts and excluding a large part of Islamic scholarly traditions.51
This circumstance explains why so many videos produced by non-believers deal with
the hypothesis of the “scientific miracle(s)” (al-i
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in cl ar, easily underst ndable Arabic? Instead, he stumbled on many verses that were 
h rd to understand and explain, and a great many that clashed with his own sense of logic 
and morality. As he was losing his faith more and more, he experienced a phase of shock, 
anger, and disappointment vis-à-vis his parents and Muslim society at large: Why were 
they telling us all those illogical stories about God, Creation, and Revelation?41 Why were 
they lying to us about the negative sides of the Prophet and the Quran? 
As much as he stresses that he was not raised in an intolerant, bigoted religious at-
mosphere, Kosay expresses a strong intellectual disaffection with liberal and progressive 
interpretations of Islam.42 He compares those who argue that the Quran does not promote 
violence and hatred with those who propagate the “scientific miracles” found in the 
Quran: both approaches rely on selective and entirely arbitrary interpretations that have 
no philological or historical basis. When it comes to the questions of violence towards 
non-believers and the subordination of women, Kosay seems convinced that the conserva-
tive and extremist shaykhs do have much of the textual evidence on their side. He fre-
quently uses “citations” in the form of short video clips from television shaykhs—all the 
way from the conservative Egyptian preacher Mutawallī Ša 
ʿ 
rāwi (1911–1998) to the league of mostly Saudi-Arabian and Egyptian Salafi scholars 
who became famous through television during the 2000s. One of his favorite references is 
Waǧdī Ġunaym (Wagdi Ghoneim, b. 1951), a firebrand preacher affiliated with the Egyp-
tian Muslim Brotherhood who espoused Salafi-Jihadist views after the 2013 coup in Egypt. 
In the clips referenced by Kosay, he defends some of the most shocking practices re-intro-
duced by the so-called “Islamic State” on the basis of traditional Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh), such as the enslavement of prisoners of war.43 Even though Kosay does not deny 
                                                          
39 https://www.youtube.com/c/KosayBetar/about (accessed 25 August 2020).  
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is a failure), 16 March 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fZMFZvKPjX4. 
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in co loquial Syrian Arabic. Th  elf-description of his channel—as of August 2020—reads 
as follows: “Hello, I’m Quṣay Bīṭār from Damascus, Syria. […] I lov  and respect all hu-
manist (insānī) and mod rate believers from any religion. The aim of my channel is to 
share my thoughts about religion, science and logic. It is an attempt to giv  the ew gen-
eratio  a chance to see things from a diff ent perspective, a c nce that I did not have 
hen I was young.”39 
Kosay started his YouTube channel in February 2018 and ha  publ shed videos on an 
almost weekly base through 2019 and 2020. His audienc  has be n creasing at a remark-
able pace: Betwee  February and Augus  2020, the number of sub cribers to his channel 
rose from 30,0 0 to 60,000, a d many of his rec nt videos have passed the threshold of 
100,000 view ; thousands of likes a d mostly favorable comments show that a considera-
ble part of the au ience is a tively engaging with the content.  
According to his own ac ount, Kosay experience  a gradual loss of f ith as a young 
adolescent that was triggered l ss by exter al changes tha  by lingering questions and 
doubts.40 Journalist Kh led Diab found  similar process in many of the non-beli vers he 
int rviewed: “For a surprisi g numb r of atheis s […] their abandonmen  of faith was, 
p radoxi ally, actually the product of an attempt to deepen it, unde stand religion better 
or silence the doubts plaguing their con ciences.” (Diab 2017, p. 255). Kosay turned to 
r ading the Qura , h pi g t  find an wers: didn’t people always say that it was written 
in clear, easily understand ble Arabic? Instead, he stumbled on many verses that were 
har  to understand and explain, and a great many t at clashed with his own sense of logic 
and morality. As he was lo ing is faith more and more, he experienced a phase of shock, 
ger, and disappointment vis-à-vis his p rents and Muslim society at large: Why were 
they telling us all those illogical stories about God, Creation, and Revelation?41 Why were 
they lying t  us about the negative sid s of the Prophet and the Quran? 
As much as he tresses that he was not raised in an i olerant, bigoted religious at-
mosphere, Kosay expresses a strong intellectual d saffec ion with liberal and progressive 
interpretations of Islam.42 He compar s t se who argue that the Qura  does not promote 
violence and hatred with those who propagate the “s ientifi  miracles” found in the 
Quran: both approaches rely on selective and entirely arbitrary interpretations that have 
no philol gical r historical basis. When it c mes to the questions of violence towards 
non-believers and the subordinati n of women, Kosay seems onvinced that the conserva-
tive and extremist haykhs do have much of he t xtual evidenc  on their side. He fre-
q ently uses “citations” in the orm of short video clips from television haykhs—all the 
way from the cons rvative Egyptian preacher Mutawallī Ša 
ʿ 
rāwi (1 11–1998) to th league of mostly Saudi-Arabian and Egyptian Salafi cholars 
who became fam s through television during the 2000s. One of his favorite r ferences is 
Waǧdī Ġunaym (Wagdi Ghoneim, b. 1951),  firebrand preacher affiliated with the Egyp-
tian Muslim Br therhood who spoused Salafi-Jihadi t vi ws after the 2013 coup in Egypt. 
In the clips r ferenced b  Kosay, he defends some of the most shocking pract ces re-intro-
duced by the so-cal ed “Islamic Sta e” on the basis of tr ditional Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh), such as the enslavement f prisoners of war.43 Even though K say does not deny 
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ilmı̄) of the Quran. This genre of
religious reasoning, which claims that the Quran—if interpreted in the proper way—has
predicted many scientific discoveries, is a common apologetic device in contemporary
Islam that is popular across different religious schools and trends. As Sherif Gaber’s
imaginary “Renos and H. amāda” dialogue shows, it is often the first counter-argument
used by Muslim believers if others question the truth of the Quran.
Another topic that is amplified by current events in the Arab world, namely the spec-
tacular rise of Salafi-Jihadism in Iraq, Syria and some other countries torn by instability and
civil war in the years after the Arab Spring, is the issue of Islam and violence. The surveyed
YouTube channels frequently refer to the views and actions of the so-called “Islamic State”
and its supporters as particularly shocking examples of religiously motivated violence.
They also claim, based on the same scriptural sources that the Jihadists themselves use to
justify their deeds (verses from the Quran and stories about the Prophet and his followers)
that this is what the “golden age” of early Islam really looked like. In this way, Jihadism
serves as an ideal foil for non-believers to confirm their rejection of Islam on intuitive moral
grounds, sometimes at the cost of avoiding any recognition of less extreme theological
readings.
Non-believers on YouTube cover similar topics based on current interest, argumenta-
tive convenience, or because they are challenged to do so by their opponents and critics, but
these do not necessarily define their p sitive vie s or core essage. There is a difference
between explaining why you do not believe in certain things and defining what kind of
non-believer you want to be. While Abdel-Samad’s approach is mostly focused “demol-
51 On the polarization of online debates about Islam and the disproportionate influence of the more radical and extreme voices in either camp see
Al-Rawi 2017.
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ishing” religion, the others also try to spell out a positive message of their own or even
provide practical advice. The fact that they openly declare a divergent religious status that
is far from self-explaining in the Arab world, already puts them under a certain pressure
to spell out the intellectual and ethical consequences. While Sherif Gaber, Adam Elmasri,
and Kosay Betar each offer a different world-view in place of Muslim and Christian theism,
they remarkably converge on ethical and social questions. All of them strongly endorse
gender equality and—a much more controversial issue in the Arab world—the acceptance
of homosexuality. It seems that their non-belief comes as a package deal with “progressive”
social views and offers the promise of an individualistic, cosmopolitan lifestyle.
An individualistic outlook also determines their views on how to deal with the vexing
social and political situation in the Arab world, where freethinkers and non-believers
still face widespread rejection and persecution (Whitaker 2017; Jackson 2018; Diab 2020).
While the challenge of political Islam, both in its moderate and radical shapes, is too
omnipresent to be ignored, Abdel-Samad is the only one who offers clearly articulated
political views on current events in the Arab world. The other YouTubers portrayed here, on
the contrary, avoid talking about politics almost completely. Their focus is, one might say,
on strengthening their own intellectual community. They seem to believe that establishing a
visible presence in the virtual public sphere is a step toward making non-belief an accepted
part of the intellectual and social landscape in the Arab world. The sense of a lively and
growing virtual community has certainly raised the confidence of non-believers and made
them more daring in their self-portrayal and in their demands on society. In this sense,
freethinking and non-belief imply an attempt to re-negotiate social and political boundaries
within Arab societies at large. One crucial question for the period ahead is how religious
authorities and institutions and common believers react to the challenge of non-belief and
how believers and non-believers negotiate their relationship. However, recent studies
about digital media in the Arab world caution us against over-estimating the potential
of emerging digital communities when it comes to challenging and dislocating deeply
entrenched social and political power structures (Richter et al. 2018, p. 4). It might be a long
way before the voice of Arab non-believers will have an impact on legal and constitutional
questions, such as family law and the prerogatives of religious authorities.
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searcher, a spiritual person without religion or God, like some of his German acquaintances 
whom he describes favorably in his autobiography? (Abdel-Samad 2010, pp. 17–36, 230–33) 
Or has he become an agnostic or an atheist? He does not say. Probably, “freethinker” would 
be a fair description. This also makes sense because it is precisely the tradition of Arab free-
thinking that allows him to be at the center of debates with people from a variety of intel-
lectual and religious trends, many of whom seem to appreciate him as a critical interlocutor. 
Looking at the “guest list” of Abdel-Samad’s channel, there is the Egyptian Aḥmad 
Saʿd Zāyid, who app ars in a erie  of episodes in 2019, is a university lecturer and fellow 
YouTuber who runs a popular channel on the “history of ideas” and calls himself a “hu-
manist.” In 2017, Abdel-Samad travelled around France and Morocco to meet a number 
of Maghrebian intellectuals and give them he opportunity to promote their published 
works. Am ng the people he i terviewed ar  Muḥammad al-Musayyaḥ, a historian and 
researcher in pre-Islamic and early Islamic manuscripts,; secularist philosopher and 
Amazigh activist Muḥamm d ʿAṣīd, Rašīd Aylāl, author of an iconoclastic book about al-
Bu ḫ 
ārī and his Hadith collection9; and Saʿīd Nāšīd, whose books promote a rationalist 
style of Islamic faith.10 Finally, there is Mouhanad Khorchide, professor of Islamic theol-
ogy at the University of Münster (Germany), with whom Abdel-Samad has also held sev-
eral public debates about “whether a reform of Islam is possible” and with whom he has 
published a common book on the same matter (Abdel-Samad and Khorchide 2017). 
Significantly, none of these guests are professing non-believers and some, like Mou-
hanad Khorchide, Aḥmad Sa’d Zāyid, and Saʿīd Nāšīd, are even avowed Sunni Muslim 
believers. Rather than the promotion of atheism, the main aim of Abdel-Samad’s channel 
seems to be the creation of a virtual “intellectual salon” for freethinkers from all over the 
Arab-speaking world, including the Western diaspora. The aim that Abdel-Samad shares 
with his guests and that motivates them to collaborate with him is to demolish religious 
dogma and replace certainty with doubt and open inquiry—freethinking in its traditional 
sense. Finding an alternative identity and philosophical answers to existential questions 
outside religion, on the contrary, do not appear as a central issue. Regarding the age of 
Abdel-Samad and his circle of guests—uniformly middle-aged and above, this might be 
a message that has a stronger appeal among the older generations in the Arab world. 
However, regarding the size of the audience, it must be considered an important current 
alongside the novel trends of non-belief. It is also transformative in the sense that Abdel-
Samad—if one accepts him as a freethinker—has probably pushed the boundaries of Arab 
freethinking as far as very few people before him.11  
In one of their debates, Mouhanad Khorchide asks Abdel-Samad, somewhat exasper-
atedly, “I really wonder how you want to reform Islam if you at the same time hold that 
it is not susceptible to reform. Which kind of offer are you trying to make to Muslims? 
Burying the prophet and abolishing the Quran is not reform.” While Abdel-Samad ducks 
the question, an increasing number of Arab activists on the internet—especially of the 
younger generation—have been offering a straightforward answer: leave Islam and be-
come a lā-dīnī (non-believer).  
3.2. Sherif Gaber: Atheist and Comedian 
According to his YouTube figures, the most successful creator of atheist content on 
the Arab internet in the late 2010s is Sherif Gaber (Šarīf Ǧābir), a young Egyptian in his 
twenties, who has 288,000 subscribers (as of August 2020) and whose most popular videos 
                                                          
9 Ṣaḥīḥ al-Buḫārī. Nihāyat usṭūra (“Sahih al-Bukhari—the end of a legend”), Rabat: Dār al-Waṭan, 2017. 
10 An expression borrowed from title of one of his books: Dalīl at-tadayyun al-ʿāqil (“A Guide to rational religiosity”), Cairo: Dār at-
Tanwīr, 2017. 
11 For portraits of previous modern Arab freethinkers like Ameen Rihani, Ǧamīl Ṣidqī az-Zahāwi and Maʿrūf ar-Ruṣāfī see Coury 
2018. 
at al-ilh. ād. MadaMasr. March 23. Available online: http://www.madamasr.com/
en/2015/10/25/opinion/culture/father-egypti -at eist-and-the-she khdom-of-atheism/ (acces d n 10 September 2020).
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that different, more moderate interpretations of Islam exist and have a broad following, 
he mistrusts the broad influence of the “bigoted” (mutaʿaṣṣibūn) shaykhs in Arab societies, 
especially over uneducated people. It’s the moral outrage at the injustice of both the foun-
dational religious texts—Quran and Hadith—and the conservative scholars and preachers 
who uphold them to this and try to force them on society, that fuels Kosay’s drive to dis-
miss the religious tradition altogether.  
Kosay’s attacks on religiou  dogma follow hi  personal explorations along the main 
paths of non-belief described above: textual criticism, philosophical reasoning, and histori-
cal inquiry. What is unique about his channel is Kosay’s thoughtful engagement with a 
question that is probably quite essential to those who have lost their faith: What now? After 
deciding to leave Islam, where do I go? What does atheism even mean and what can non-
believers contribute to society that believers can’t? How do I counter accusations and prej-
udice? How do I sort out my relationship with believers, both intellectually and emotion-
ally? 
In one of his earliest videos, Ko ay tak s to task the arrogance and excessive in-
group/out-group thinking of many non-believers, especially ce t ones: “Atheism does 
not make you more intelligent or more educated!”44 Some have left religion merely be-
cause of an emotional crisis or because it is “cool.”45 Many atheists, he warns, have expe-
rienced a sudden, superficial and ill-digested conversion, which then becomes a source of 
intolerance and bigotry. Here, Kosay echoes (self-)critical tones that are not uncommon 
among Egyptian non-believers, too (Schielke 2013, p. 646; Andeel 2015). Kosay insists that 
atheists should be the first to respect others and other opinions because the lack of intel-
lectual freedom inside religion is exactly why they left it. He sugge ts that being a believer 
or o  i  not a matter of intelligence (ḏakā  
ʾ 
) but of c nviction (iqtināʿ), and people with ifferent convictions can still respect and 
love each other. Still, unbelievers have something important to give because they contrib-
ute to the spread of science and logic in societies that have been intellectually stagnant for 
a long time. 
On a related note, Kosay points out that people who have left religion are still in search 
of a worldview and an ethical orientation that they find rationally convincing and emotion-
ally appealing.46 The path toward settling on a new conviction can be long and arduous. 
For example, there is no teleological prog ession fro religious belief to dei m, then agnos-
ticism, and finally positive atheism. Any of those stages is a valid intellectu stance in itself. 
Kosay stresses that is it important to explain these differences to religious believers as well, 
in order to counteract the problem that non-believers in Arab societies get lumped together 
indiscriminately under the label of atheism (ilḥād), which is fraught with negative connota-
tions.47 Kosay makes a lot of effort to confront the most common preconceptions and accu-
sations faced by non-believers and to suggest effective counter-arguments.  
For example, it is a common misconception (according to Kosay) that atheism and its 
emphasis on science leads to a materialist belief in the non-existence of God.48 In contrast, 
he proposes th  non-believers simply place knowledge above beli f and hence refuse to 
beli ve in things or theories that they do not find intellectually convincing, a stance called 
agnosticism (lā adrīya). When Muslim believers portray disbelief as so ething eccentric 
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46 Ibid.  
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48 Ibid. 
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that different, more moderate interpretations of Islam exist and have a broad following, 
he mistrusts the broad influence of the “bigoted” (mutaʿaṣṣibūn) shaykhs in Arab societies, 
especially over uneducated people. It’s the moral outrage at the injustice of both the foun-
dational religious texts—Quran and Hadith—and the conservative scholars and preachers 
who uphold them to this and try to force them on society, that fuels Kosay’s drive to dis-
miss the religious tradition altogether.  
Kosay’s attacks on religious dogma follow his personal explorations along the main 
paths of non-belief described above: textual criticism, philosophical reasoning, and histori-
cal inquiry. What is unique about his channel is Kosay’s thoughtful engagement with a 
question that is probably quite essential to those who have lost their faith: What now? After 
deciding to leave Islam, where do I go? What does atheism even mean and what can non-
believers contribute to society that believers can’t? How do I counter accusations and prej-
udice? How do I sort out my relationship with believers, both intellectually and emotion-
ally? 
In one of his earliest videos, Kosay takes to task the arrogance and excessive in-
group/out-group thinking of many non-believers, especially recent ones: “Atheism does 
not make you more intelligent or more educated!”44 Some have left religion merely be-
cause of an emotional crisis or because it is “cool.”45 Many atheists, he warns, have expe-
rienced a sudden, superficial and ill-digested conversion, which then becomes a source of 
intolerance and bigotry. Here, Kosay echoes (self-)critical tones that are not uncommon 
among Egyptian non-believers, too (Schielke 2013, p. 646; Andeel 2015). Kosay insists that 
atheists should be the first to respect others and other opinions because the lack of intel-
lectual freedom insid  religion is exactly why they left it. He suggests th t being a believer 
or not is not a matter of intelligence (ḏakā  
ʾ 
) but of conviction (iqtināʿ), and people with different convictions can still respect and 
love each other. Still, unbelievers have something important to give because they contrib-
ute to the spread of science and logic in societies that have been intellectually stagnant for 
a long time. 
On a related note, Kosay points out that people who have left religion are still in search 
of a worldview and an ethical orientation that they find rationally convincing and emotion-
ally appealing.46 The path toward settling on a new conviction can be long and arduous. 
For example, there is no teleological progression from religious belief to deism, then agnos-
ticism, and finally positive atheism. Any of those stages is a valid intellectual stance in itself. 
Kosay stresses that is it important to explain these differences to religious believers as well, 
in order to counteract the problem that non-believers in Arab societies get lumped together 
indiscriminately under the label of atheism (ilḥād), which is fraught with negative connota-
tions.47 Kosay makes a lot of effort to confront the most common preconceptions and accu-
sations faced by non-believers and to suggest effective counter-arguments.  
For example, it is a common misconception (according to Kosay) that atheism and its 
emphasis on science leads to a materialist belief in the non-existence of God.48 In contrast, 
he proposes that non-believers simply place knowledge above belief and hence refuse to 
believe in things or theories that they do not find intellectually convincing, a stance called 
agnosticism (lā adrīya). When Muslim believers portray disbelief as something eccentric 
                                                          
 The achievements of Arab atheists), 19 April 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jYDIvv3Jgnw; Cf. the) انجازات الملحدين العرب 44
observation by Anthon Jackson: “Of course, there is plenty of in-group/out-group thinking on Egyptian atheist forums, including 
outright mockery of what many members see as pure religious lunacy.” (Jackson 2018).  
 ,The deceivers #7—the path towards non-belief), 8 August 2019) المغالطون الحلقة 7 - الطريق إلى الالدينية 45
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ITOs5XIEhZ0.  
46 Ibid.  
 ,Belief and unbelief and the probability of the existence of God), 5 December 2019) اإليمان و اإللحاد و إحتمالية وجود هللا 47
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_hpNTYZ20ig.  
48 Ibid. 
ān. In Encyclopaedia of the Qur
Religions 2021, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 14 of 20 
 
 
that differ nt, more moderate interpretations of Islam exist and have a broad following, 
he mistrusts the broad influence of the “bigoted” (mutaʿaṣṣibūn) shaykhs in Arab societies, 
especially over uneducated p ople. It’s the m ral utrage at the injustice of both the foun-
d tional relig ous texts—Quran and Hadith—and the conservative scholars and preachers 
who uphold them to this and try to orce them on socie y, that fuels Kosay’s drive to dis-
miss the religious tradition altogether.  
Kosay’s attacks on religi us dogma follow his person l explorations along the main 
paths of non-belief de cribed ab ve: textual criticism, philosophical reasoning, and histori-
cal inquiry. What is unique about his chan el is Kosay’s t oughtful engagement with a 
questio  tha  is probably quit es ential to t ose who have lost their faith: What now? After 
deci ing t  leave Islam, where do I go? Wh t oes heism even mean and what can non-
believers contribute to society that believers can’ ? How o I counter accusations and prej-
udice? How do I sort out my relatio ship with believ rs, b th intellectually and emotion-
ally? 
In one of his earliest videos, Kosay takes to ta k the arrogance and excessive in-
group/out-group thinking of many no -believers, especially recent ones: “Atheism does 
not make you more intelligent or more educated!”44 Some have left religion merely be-
cause of an emotional crisis or becau e it is “cool.”45 Many atheists, he warns, have expe-
rienced a sudden, superficial and ll-digested conversi n, which then becomes a source of 
intolerance and bigotry. Here, Kosay echoes (self-)critical t es that are not uncommon 
among Egyptian non-believers, too (Schielke 2013, p. 646; Andeel 2015). Kosay insists that 
ath ists sh uld be the first t  respect other  and other opinions because the lack of intel-
lectual freedom inside r ligion is xactly w y th y left it. He suggests that being a believer 
or not is not a matter of intelligence (ḏakā  
ʾ 
) but of convic ion (iqtināʿ), a d pe ple with different convictions can still respect and 
lo e each other. Still, unbelievers have something important to give because they contrib-
ute to the spread of cience nd logic in societies that have been intellectually stagnant for 
a long time. 
On a related note, Kosay points out that people who have left religion are still in search 
of a worldview nd an ethical orientation that they find rationally convincing and emotion-
ally app aling.46 The path toward settling on a new conviction can be long and arduous. 
For ex mple, there is n  teleological progression from reli ious belief to deism, then agnos-
icism, and finally po itiv  atheism. A y of those t ges s a valid intellectual stance in itself. 
Kosay str sses that i  it important explain these differences to religious believers as well, 
in order to counteract the problem that non-be ievers in Arab societies get lumped together 
indiscriminately un er the label of at eism (ilḥād), whi h is fr ught with negative connota-
tions.47 Kosay makes a lot of effort to confront the most common preconceptions and accu-
sations faced by non-believers and to s gges  effective counter-arguments.  
For example, it is a mmon misconception (accordi g to Kosay) that atheism and its 
emphasis on sci nce leads to a materialist belief in the non-existence of God.48 In contrast, 
he proposes that non-believ rs simply place knowl dge above belief and hence refuse to 
believe in things or theories that they do ot find intell ctually convincing, a stance called 
agnostic sm (lā adrīya). When Mus m believers portray disbelief as something eccentric 
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in colloquial Syrian Arabic. The self-description of his channel—as of August 2020—reads 
as follows: “Hello, I’m Quṣay Bīṭār from Damascus, Syria. […] I love and respect all hu-
manist (insānī) and moderate believers from any religion. The aim of my channel is to 
share my thoughts about religion, science and logic. It is an attempt to give the new gen-
eration a chance to see things from a different perspective, a chance that I did not have 
when I was young.”39 
Kosay started his YouTube channel in February 2018 and has published videos on an 
almost weekly base through 2019 and 2020. His audience has been increasing at a remark-
able pace: Between February and August 2020, the number of subscribers to his channel 
rose from 30,000 to 60,000, and many of his recent videos have passed the threshold of 
100,000 views; thousands of likes and mostly favorable comments show that a considera-
ble part of the audience is actively engaging with the content.  
According to his own account, Kosay experienced a gradual loss of faith as a young 
adolescent that was triggered less by external changes than by lingering questions and 
doubts.40 Journalist Khaled Diab found a similar process in many of the non-believers he 
interviewed: “For a surprising number of atheists […] their abandonment of faith was, 
paradoxically, actually the product of an attempt to deepen it, understand religion better 
or silence the doubts plaguing their consciences.” (Diab 2017, p. 255). Kosay turned to 
reading the Quran, hoping to find answers: didn’t people always say that it was written 
in clear, easily understandable Arabic? Instead, he stumbled on many verses that were 
hard to understand and explain, and a great many that clashed with his own sense of logic 
and morality. As he was losing his faith more and more, he experienced a phase of shock, 
anger, and disappointment vis-à-vis his parents and Muslim society at large: Why were 
they telling us all those illogical stories about God, Creation, and Revelation?41 Why were 
they lying to us about the negative sides of the Prophet and the Quran? 
As much as he stresses that he was not raised in an intolerant, bigoted religious at-
mosphere, Kosay expresses a strong intellectual disaffection with liberal and progressive 
interpretations of Islam.42 He compares those who argue that the Quran does not promote 
violence and hatred with those who propagate the “scientific miracles” found in the 
Quran: both approaches rely on selective and entirely arbitrary interpretations that have 
no philological or historical basis. Whe  it com s to the questions of violence towards 
non-believers an  th  subordination of women, Kosay seems convinced that the conserva-
tive and extremist shaykhs do have much of the textual evidence on their side. He fre-
quently uses “citations” in the form of short video clips from television shaykhs—all the 
way from the conservative Egyptian preacher Mutawallī Ša 
ʿ 
rāwi (1911–1998) to the league of mostly Saudi-Arabian and Egyptian Salafi scholars 
who became famous through television during the 2000s. One of his favorite references is 
Waǧdī Ġunaym (Wagdi Ghoneim, b. 1951), a firebrand preacher affiliated with the Egyp-
tian Muslim Brotherhood who espoused Salafi-Jihadist views after the 2013 coup in Egypt. 
In the clips referenced by Kosay, he defends some of the most shocking practices re-intro-
duced by the so-called “Islamic State” on the basis of traditional Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh), such as the enslavement of prisoners of war.43 Even though Kosay does not deny 
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that different, more moderate interpretations of Islam exist and have a broad following, 
he mistrusts the broad influence of the “bigoted” (mutaʿaṣṣibūn) shaykhs in Arab societies, 
especially over uneducated people. It’s the moral outrage at the injustice of both the foun-
dational religious texts—Quran and Hadith—and the conservative scholars and preachers 
who uphold them to this and try to force them on society, that fuels Kosay’s drive to dis-
miss the religious tradition altogether.  
Kosay’s attacks on religious dogma follow his personal explorations along the main 
paths of non-belief described above: textual criticism, philosophical reasoning, and histori-
cal inquiry. What is unique about his channel is Kosay’s thoughtful engagement with a 
question that is probably quite essential to those who have lost their faith: What now? After 
deciding to leave Islam, where do I go? What does atheism even mean and what can non-
believers contribute to society that believers can’t? How do I counter accusations and prej-
udice? How do I sort out my relationship with believers, both intellectually and emotion-
ally? 
I  one of his earliest vide s, Kos y takes t  task the a rogance and excessive in-
group/out-g oup thinking of many non-believers, especially recent o es: “Atheism does 
not make you more intelligent or more educated!”44 Some have left religion merely be-
cause of an emotional crisis or because it is “cool.”45 Many atheists, he warns, have expe-
rienced a sudden, superficial and ill-digested conversion, which then becomes a source of 
intolerance and bigotry. Here, Kosay echoes (self-)critical tones that are not uncommon 
among Egyptian non-believers, too (Schielke 2013, p. 646; Andeel 2015). Kosay insists that 
atheists should be the first to respect others and other opinions because the lack of intel-
lectual fre dom inside religion is exactly w y they left it. He suggests that being a believer 
or not is not a matter of intelligence (ḏakā  
ʾ 
) but of conviction (iqtināʿ), and people with different convictions can still respect and 
love each other. Still, unbelievers have something important to give because they contrib-
ute to the spread of science and logic in societies that have been intellectually stagnant for 
a long time. 
On a related note, Kosay points out that people ho have left religion are still in search 
of a worldview and an ethical orientation that they find rationally convincing and emotion-
ally appealing.46 The path toward settling on a new conviction can be long and arduous. 
For example, there is no teleological progression from religious belief to deism, then agnos-
ticism, and finally positive atheism. Any of those stages is a valid intellectual stance in itself. 
Kosay stresses that is it important to explain these differences to religious believers as well, 
in order to counteract the problem that non-believers in Arab societies get lumped together 
indiscriminately under the label of atheism (ilḥād), which is fraught with neg tive connota-
tions.47 Kosay makes a lot of effort to confront the most common preconceptions and accu-
sations faced by non-believers and to suggest effective counte -arguments.  
For example, it is a common misconception (according to Kosay) that atheism and its 
emphasis on science leads to a materialist belief in the non-existenc  of God.48 In contrast, 
he proposes that non-believers simply place knowledge above belief and hence refuse to 
believe in things or theories that they do not find intellectually convincing, a stance called 
agnosticism (lā adrīya). When Muslim believers portray disbelief as something eccentric 
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n c lloquial Syrian Arabic. The self-description of his channel—as of August 2020—reads 
as follows: “Hello, I’m Quṣay Bīṭār from Damascus, Syria. […] I love and respect all hu-
m ist (insānī) and moderate believers from any religion. The aim of my channel is to 
share my though s abou  rel gion, science and logic. It is an attempt to give the new gen-
eration a chance to see things from a differ nt perspective, a chance that I did not have 
when I was young.”39 
Kosay st rted his YouTube channel in February 2018 and has published videos on an 
almost weekly bas  through 2019 and 2020. His audience has been increasing at a remark-
able pace: Between February and August 2020, the number of subscribers to his channel 
rose from 30,000 to 60,000, and many f his recent videos have passed the threshold of 
100,000 vi ws; thousands of likes and mostly favorable comments show that a considera-
ble part of the audience is actively engaging with the content.  
Ac ording to his wn account, Kosay experienced a gradual loss of faith as a young 
adolescent that was tri gered less by external changes than by lingering questions and 
doubts.40 Jour alist Khaled Diab found a similar process in many of the non-believers he 
interviewed: “For a surprising number of atheists […] their abandonment of faith was, 
parad xically, actually the product f an attempt to deepen it, understand religion better 
or silence the doubts plaguing their consciences.” (Diab 2017, p. 255). Kosay turned to 
reading the Quran, hoping to f nd nswers: didn’t people always say that it was written 
in clear, easily understandable Arabic? Inst ad, he stumbled on many verses that were 
hard to understand and explai , a d a great many that clashed with his own sense of logic 
and morality. As h  was losing i  faith more and more, he experienced a phase of shock, 
a ger, and disappointmen vis-à-vis his parents and Muslim society at large: Why were 
they telling us all thos  illog cal stories about God, Creation, and Revelation?41 Why were 
they lying to us about the negative sides of the Prophet and the Quran? 
As much as he stresses hat he was not raised in an intolerant, bigoted religious at-
mosphere, Kosay expresses a strong intellectual disaffection with liberal and progressive 
interpretations of Islam.42 He compares th s  who argue that the Quran does not promote 
viol nce and ha red with those who propagate the “scientific miracles” found in the 
Quran: both approaches rely on selective and entirely arbitrary interpretations that have 
n  philological or historical b sis. When it comes to the questions of violence towards 
non believ rs and the subordination f women, Kosay seems convinced that the conserva-
tive and extrem st shaykhs do hav  much of the textual evidence on their side. He fre-
quently uses “cita ions” in the form of short video clips from television shaykhs—all the 
way from the conservative Egyptian preacher Mutawallī Ša 
ʿ 
rāwi (1911–1998) to the league of m stly Saudi-Arabian and Egyptian Salafi scholars 
who became famous through televisio  during the 2000s. One of his favorite references is 
Waǧdī Ġunaym (Wagd  Ghoneim, b. 1951), a firebrand preacher affiliated with the Egyp-
tian Muslim Brotherhood who espoused Salafi-Jihadist views after the 2013 coup in Egypt. 
In th  clips referenced by Kos y, h  d fe ds some of the most shocking practices re-intro-
duced by the so-called “Islamic State” o  the basis of traditional Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh), such as the enslavement f prisoners of war.43 Even though Kosay does not deny 
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